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Perceptions of police trustworthiness are linked to citizens’ willingness to cooperate with police. 
Trust can be fostered by introducing accountability mechanisms, or by increasing a shared 
police/citizen identity, both which can be achieved digitally. Digital mechanisms can also be 
designed to safeguard, engage, reassure, inform, and empower diverse communities. We 
systematically scoped 240 existing online citizen-police and relevant third-party communication 
apps, to examine whether they sought to meet community needs and policing visions. We found 
that 82% required registration or login details, 55% of those with a reporting mechanism allowed 
for anonymous reporting, and 10% provided an understandable privacy policy. Police apps were 
more likely to seek to reassure, safeguard and inform users, while third-party apps were more 
likely to seek to empower users. As poorly designed apps risk amplifying mistrust and 
undermining policing efforts, we suggest 12 design considerations to help ensure the 
development of high quality/fit for purpose Police/Citizen apps. 
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Policing 101 (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.) states that: 
Positive police-community relationships are essential to 
maintaining public safety and order. These relationships help to 
reduce fear and biases, and build mutual understanding and 
trust between the police and community (page 9).  
The importance of these relationships are based upon Peel’s (1929) nine principles of 
policing (cited in The Home Office, n.d.; The Law Enforcement Action Partnership, n.d.), the 
seventh of which conceives of the police also as civilians and civilians also as police. However, 
there is some debate as to the extent to which US police are connected to these principles 
(Adegbile, 2017), as there are more than 18,000 police departments in the US that are subject to 
different laws and codes (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.). In the UK, Peelian principles have 
also influenced policing (The Home Ofice, n.d), but the sections of the Policing Vision 2025 of 
relevance to community policing are focused on ‘protecting and reassuring communities’ 
(NPCC, 2015). Whether community policing strategies seek to reduce fear and bias, or protect 
and reassure communities, policing efforts can be hampered by a range of factors including: 
power imbalances and inequality (e.g. Gasper, 2012); prejudice (Kochel, Wilson, & Mastrofski 
2011); and by a lack of clear or transparent policies or procedures (see Brucato, 2015, for a 
commentary). These issues contribute to mistrust (Ray, Marsh, & Powelson, 2017) and an 
asymmetry in citizen-police collaboration (e.g. Fulla & Welch, 2002)1.  
Goldsmith (2005) described trust as the ways that interactions and experiences contribute 
to expectations about future treatment. Based on three presumptions, summarised by Six (2003) 
as benevolence, dedication and ethics, Goldsmith lists nine behaviours that contribute to mistrust 
in police. These are: neglect; indifference; incompetence; discrimination; brutality; venality; 
extortion; intimidation; and excessive force. Goldsmith also proposed that trust can be increased 
 
1 This research is of value internationally. However, the authors were based in the UK, and most of the 
apps in the final sample were hosted in the US, so we focused on the policing principles and missions of the US and 
the UK. 
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with accountability, and listed three key actions of information, influence, and control (identified 
by Six, 2003) to achieve this.  
It is in the interest of police and citizens to foster trust, as there is a robust association 
between police trustworthiness (Goldsmith, 2005), fairness and/or perceived legitimacy 
(Jackson, Bradford, Stanko, & Hohl, 2012), and cooperation with police (see Cao, 2014, for a 
commentary). Fostering trust has become urgent in the advent of the widespread use of social 
media, as civilians are able to share police data. For instance, genuine mistakes, such as the 
shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes (2005); incidents of inappropriate behaviour (Weitzer, 
2006); incompetency or coverups (e.g. the death of Christian Andreacchio; Tenderfoot TV & 
Black Mountain Media, 2019); or police brutality (e.g. the killings of Freddie Gray, Undisclosed, 
2017; and George Floyd, BBC, 2020) are all accessible online. Therefore, tensions between 
police and some communities are high (Upton Patton et al. 2016). 
One way to foster trust is to introduce accountability mechanisms for citizens to collect 
evidence, file complaints, raise community awareness, verify police performance (and corrective 
action), and to support citizens while doing so (Goldsmith, 2005). Another approach might be to 
build community identities (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000) and shared identities between police and 
citizens, as this can increase social solidarity between them (Jackson & Bradford, 2010). Citizens 
are also more willing to cooperate in investigations and disclose information when they identify 
with the police and feel included in what the group represents (Bradford, 2014). Shared 
identification with the police should therefore promote citizen information disclosure and 
cooperation, which may assist the police in investigations.  
Digital technologies help to create shared identities (Hartz-Karp, Anderson, Gasti, & 
Felicetti, 2010) by creating online communities (e.g. Mumsnet, n.d.) or allowing individuals to 
share common goals (e.g. Movember, n.d.). They can involve interactive “smart” systems that 
are scalable (Chaudhari, Dal, Nikhare, Dayal, & Golghate, 2018) to diverse needs and interests 
of individuals or communities (Mills, 2011). They can also encourage people to get involved in 
‘citizen forensics’ such as sharing evidence, advocacy, or ‘web sleuthing’. This is a practice 
where people use publicly-available resources to conduct amateur investigations, in an attempt to 
solve crimes (e.g. Yardley, Lynes, Wilson, & Kelly, 2018), such as ‘Facebook identifications’ 
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(Mack & Sampson, 2013) before attending an official police lineup, or searching for missing 
people (Cruz-Santiago, 2017). There are also an increasing number of crime-solving websites 
(e.g. crimemuseum.org), forums (e.g.WebSleuths.com), and podcasts (e.g. Undisclosed-
podcast.com), which can appeal to people’s interest in solving crime. Web sleuthing justifiably 
raises concerns about vigilantism (e.g. Campbell, 2016). However, a recent literature review by 
Yardley et al. found that under four percent of web sleuthing activities were related to concerns 
about vigilantism, while almost ninety one percent were beneficial (e.g. content co-creation and 
exchange). This suggests that web sleuthing can be helpfully integrated into criminal justice 
systems (Huey Nhan, & Broll, 2013), for instance via Police Support Officers (Home Office, 
2016), provided that digital technologies are designed to minimise vigilantism. Steps also need to 
be taken to provide ways to minimise the inclusion of erroneous web sleuthing information, 
which can interfere with investigations, erode trust, and make police cautious about providing 
web sleuthing mechanisms (Huey et al.). 
Digital technologies also allow “digital citizens” to participate in and challenge the 
practices of authorities and institutions (Mossberger, Tolber, & McNeal, 2007). There is huge 
potential to provide forensically assured digital accountability mechanisms, as these can be 
programmed to be inclusive, transparent, fair, and available at any time. However, they need to 
be designed in a way that amplifies the overarching police mission, whilst having an architecture 
that is flexible enough to align with specific demographics. They also need to be managed by 
police officers who are technically skilled and motivated to interact with them. Thus, digital 
accountability mechanisms have the potential to transform traditional models of public service, 
governance and civic engagement, potentially motivating individuals in different communities to 
engage in things that are relevant to them.  
Digital technologies are already being used for citizen-police communication, but these 
have not been built on systematic research, so little is understood about how they are used; 
whether they seek to reassure citizens (that police are transparent and accountable, and open to 
feedback); whether they seek to empower citizens (so that they can hold authorities to account); 
whether they seek to engage citizens (in an attempt to create a sense of shared identity); or 
whether they just disseminate top-down information. To maximise effective digital collaboration 
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between citizens and police, greater understanding of how digital evidence and intelligence is 
gathered, used, and appropriated, is required.  
The aims of this study are to systematically scope existing online citizen-police 
communication apps, and to examine whether they seek to: enhance crime prevention and 
response; meet community needs; engage, include and empower “digital” citizens; foster shared 
identities; and whether they are forensically assured, private, and contextually appropriate. The 
study focuses on similarities and differences between apps hosted by police and those hosted by 
third parties (including charities, companies, and community groups). Specifically, it asks 
whether the apps: 
Protect user data 
Seek to reassure users 
Seek to safeguard users 
Seek to empower or engage users 
Seek to share information with users 
Are navigable and presentable 
The study concludes by providing design considerations for the development of future 
Police-Citizen apps, based upon the present research. 
Methods 
Apps Sources 
The present scoping review was informed by the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & 
Altman, 2010). To systematically retrieve relevant apps, a computer search of the Google Play 
store was conducted. Initial computer searches were conducted by one author with computing 
expertise according to keywords agreed upon by all authors. Subsequent inclusion/exclusion 
steps were led by two other authors. 
Computer Search 
The Google Play store was searched using combinations of the following keywords:  
COMMUNITY POLICING APPS 
 6 
Community/community-
driven/neighbo(u)rhood/smart+policing/app/engagement/collaboration/communication. 
Community/neighbo(u)rhood+crime+evidence/witness/prevention/reporting/justice /+app  
A standalone scraping tool (Parsehub Standard Version, n.d.) was used to extract the apps 
from Google Play (n.d.). The search was conducted between 1st July to 4th July (inclusive), 
2019, by authors from the computing department of university. Following the steps taken by 
them, a final list of 1207 apps was identified. At this point, authors from the psychology 
department followed inclusion/exclusion steps before running the analyses for the current 
scoping study. The search was conducted within a limited time, to control for the ephemeral 
nature of apps. Indeed, a few apps became inaccessible in the time between collection and 
analysis due to broken URLs. Thus, all analyses in the present study relate only to the way 
existing apps functioned at the time of analysis (16th September – 15th October, 2019, inclusive). 
Exclusion and Inclusion Criteria 
The aim was to evaluate apps that encouraged interactive dyadic communication between 
police and citizens (or between citizens and citizens about police or community concerns). As it 
was not possible to detect whether apps included mechanisms that allowed for dyadic 
conversations just by reading the information provided on Google Play store listing webpages, 
the presence of some kind of integrated communication mechanism was designated the minimum 
requirement for inclusion. Apps that did not meet this threshold were excluded. When it came to 
the stakeholders concerned (e.g. police or digital citizens), we used information provided on 
Google Play store listing webpages. We only included apps either hosted by police or related to 
citizen concerns. Thus, inclusion/exclusion criteria were shaped by the presence or absence of an 
interactive communication mechanism (e.g. reporting, feedback, or messaging), and the 
stakeholders concerned (for full inclusion/exclusion steps, see Appendix A, for app locations, see 
Appendix B).  
The final sample included 240 apps. These were installed on Android One Mi A2 Lite 
mobile phones. Research phones were registered to research google accounts, to protect the 
privacy of the authors when using the apps. 
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Measurements 
For the final apps we scored 15 measures, some of which were taken from a previous 
website scoping review (Moore & Harrison, 2018), some which were provided by Google Play, 
and some which were driven by the examination of the apps themselves. For instance, some apps 
included statistics, mission statements, safeguarding tips, or events, but others did not, so these 
items were divided into six different themes (measures), under the heading ‘app features’. The 
definition and source of each measure is described below.  
Measures identified by Moore & Harrison (2018): 
Host: This measure was inspired by Moore and Harrison’s measure ‘author’ (2018). We 
changed the name to reflect the fact that apps are commonly designed by developers who do not 
host the final product2. Hosts were coded into ‘third-party’ (private businesses, or community 
groups, e.g. neighbourhood watch, charities, NGOs); & ‘police’ (police, sheriffs etc.).  
Navigation: This measure was included to determine how easy it was for users to find 
their way around the app, and/or how well maintained it was. Apps with a clear menu or index 
that linked to each page were assigned 2 points. Apps that needed several clicks (or were 
unclear/confusing) to access some pages scored 1. Apps scored 0 if they were difficult to 
navigate, e.g. lack of menu, confusing (or hidden) links, navigation loops, or if they needed a 
search option. The range was from 0-2 points.  
Presentation: Clear, uncluttered apps (e.g. a balance between text and pictures) were 
assigned 2 points. A score of 1 was given to apps with mediocre presentation (e.g. images that 
made poor use of space). Confusing and cluttered apps scored 0 (e.g. too much information on a 
page). The range was from 0-2 points.  
Measures identified in the apps: 
 
2 App design pressures are not only driven by policing concerns. External developers have their own 
interests in the app and the data generated. 
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Data Protection 
Informed consent: This measure was inspired by Moore and Harrison’s measure 
‘readability’ (2018). It was included to determine whether users could access a privacy policy 
before installing the app (on the app landing page), and whether it was understandable. Failure to 
make policies readable to the average user is discriminatory, and of ethical concern, as users will 
not have provided informed consent if they do not understand the policy. We tested whether the 
privacy policies of the apps were readable by calculating a Flesch reading ease score with an 
online calculator (Felsch, n.d.). Scores range from 0-100, and scores of 60-70 are considered 
acceptable.  
Inclusivity: This measure was included as it is important for police apps to be as 
inclusive as possible, so that marginalised groups can access them more readily. Apps that did 
not require data permissions, login or registration, scored 3 points (fully inclusive); those that 
required some personal data (e.g. location) to access certain functions (partially inclusive) scored 
2 points; those that required users to create an account or register to access them (partially 
exclusive) scored 1 point; those that required additional permissions or membership to install 
them, or had fees that were not mentioned on the app website, (fully exclusive) scored 0 points. 
There was a range from 0-3 points.  
Anonymity: Anonymous reporting is the standard approach taken in the sector, including 
by Crimestoppers (n.d). Anonymity is important when reporting sensitive issues (e.g. crime) and 
safeguarding citizens from possible retaliation, so it is important that apps which include 
reporting mechanisms also give users control over aspects of their anonymity when reporting. 
We explored this by seeing whether apps with reporting mechanisms also included anonymous 
reporting options. For an app with a reporting mechanism to be categorised as ‘anonymous’, 
anonymity options had to be (i) made explicit before a user made a report (as it is important for 
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users to know what will happen to their data prior to reporting), and (ii) provide anonymous 
options. Apps that met both these criteria scored 1 point, otherwise they scored 0 points3.  
App Features 
Reassuring: For this measure, we focused on Six’s key actions (2003) and Goldsmith’s 
behaviours (2005). These were information (e.g. a mission statement or feedback mechanism); 
influence (e.g. response to citizen feedback); discrimination (acknowledgement of, or 
commitment to, reducing discrimination); and brutality (e.g. citizen rights). This measure also 
reflected the idea of accountability mechanisms (Goldsmith, 2005) and was key to the 
reassurance element of the Policing Vision 2025 (NCPP, 2015). 
If apps included either procedural policies, freedom of information, or a mission 
statement, they scored 1 point, if they did not, they scored 0 points; if apps claimed to follow up 
user input (e.g. communicated with a citizen who had submitted a crime tip) they scored 1 point, 
if not they scored 0 points; if they claimed to provide users with a means to provide feedback to 
the hosts (e.g. complaint) they scored 1 point, if not they scored 0 points; if they informed users 
of their rights or demonstrated a commitment to reducing prejudice or bias they scored 1 point, if 
not they scored 0 points. There was a range of 0-4 points.  
Safeguarding: This measure reflected the safety element of the Policing Vision 2025 
(NCPP, 2015). If apps provided alerts or warnings (e.g. crimes or natural disasters), wanted 
‘posters’, safety tips (e.g. burglar prevention), tools (e.g. compasses, maps), crime maps, house 
watch schemes (e.g. police ‘drive-by’), property logging, checking in schemes (e.g. on 
vulnerable adults) they scored a point for each. Also, if apps provide an integrated means to get 
immediate response to an emergency (e.g. a 999 button) they scored 1 point, if not they scored 0 
points. There was a range from 0-9 points.  
 
3 Note: as we could not submit a fake police report, it was impossible to know whether statements about 
anonymity were carried out in practice. Thus, this measure only gave an impression of the extent to which the app 
hosts were taking anonymity into account. 
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Empowering: This measure reflected the idea of using accountability mechanisms to 
raise community awareness (Goldsmith, 2005). For this measure, we focused on Six’s key action 
(2003) of control (sharing responsibility, delegating or collaborating with citizens). If apps 
provided means for communities to respond to SOS (e.g. a distressed user alerting other users); 
to notify others about risk (e.g. a crime or natural disaster); or raised awareness, rights, resources 
(e.g. charity funding pages), they scored 1 point for each. The range was 0-3 points.  
Engaging: This measure evaluated the extent to which apps sought to create a shared 
citizen/police identity (Jackson & Bradford, 2010) with shared values, including the notion of 
police being citizens as well as law enforcers (The Home Office, n.d.). If apps provided social 
media (e.g. Twitter), chat options (e.g. a wall or forum), recruitment, events, a gallery, 
membership or collaboration, training (e.g. cadets), community interaction (e.g. ‘ride-along’), 
they scored a point. The range was from 0-8 points.  
Information Sharing: This measure described the type of information shared, and 
whether it was accurate and timely (Six, 2003). If apps provided information: statistics; terms 
and definitions; reports; news; FAQs; they scored 1 point for each. Also, if the app provided 
document services (e.g. applications or online forms) they scored 1 point, if not they scored 0. 
The range was from 0-6 points.  
Surveillance and Tracking: This measure was included as providing information about 
sex offenders can lead to vigilantism (Cubellis, Evans & Fera, 2018). Some apps provided users 
with ways to track or surveil other individuals (e.g. sex offender maps). These were deemed 
ethically unsound, and with the potential to incite vigilantism. Therefore, if these were present, 
the app scored 0 points, if they were not present, the app scored 1 point.  
The range of possible scores was therefore 0-40 points in total. 
To evaluate the systematic reliability of the measures, two raters independently scored a 
subsample of 35 apps (20.47% of the total sample). We calculated Gwet’s AC1 and AC2 
coefficients to assess interrater agreement (Gwet, 2014). All agreements were between .79 and 1 
indicating excellent reliability (Fleiss, 1981) (Appendix C).  
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Measures provided by Google Play:  
App_ratings: These were the average user ratings (with a possible range between 1 and 
5). The minimum score users could select was 1 (for apps users considered to be poor), and the 
maximum score they could select was 5 (for apps they considered to be excellent)4. This was the 
sole user experience measure. 
Results 
Data Protection 
The present research was interested in differences between police and third-party apps, so 
we analysed the data protection measures as a function of the app host (police; third-party). The 
null hypotheses were that there would be no difference in i) informed consent; ii) inclusivity; or 
iii) anonymity, between police and third-party apps. When it came to informed consent, we 
included data from the 171 apps (as we could access the data of exclusive apps without installing 
them), but for the remaining measures we only analysed data from inclusive apps, as only these 
would be accessible to citizens without logging in (n = 64).  
Informed Consent 
We tested whether users could access a privacy policy before installing the app, and 
whether that policy was understandable to the average user, as users will not have provided 
informed consent if they do not understand the policy. The privacy policies (that explained how 
user data would be collected and used) were usually found on the landing page of each app, as it 
was at this point that users could decide whether to install the app or not. We were interested in 
determining how readable these privacy policies were. We used Flesch (n.d.) to test the 
 
4 Google changed their rating mechanism in August, 2019. The present data was analysed after this change, 
but was collected before the change, so the rating mechanism used in the present research might not reflect current 
Google ratings. 
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readability of each privacy policy, as it provides clear labels about how easy a document is to 
read, as well as providing scores.  
When calculating reading ease, the mean readability score was 39.18 (SD = 8.87). This 
indicates that the policies were largely ‘difficult to read’ for someone without a university level 
education. A reading ease score of 60-70 is considered acceptable or ‘average’, but only three 
apps (1.75%) with privacy policies were within this acceptable range: We Are All Police (67.5); 
Rutland Neighbourhood Watch (65.9); and Your999 (64.7). 35.67% either provided no privacy 
policy or there was no access to it.  
To determine the relationship between host and informed consent, a chi-square was 
conducted, but no significant relationship was found, χ2 = 5,70, p = .06: it made no difference 
who hosted the apps (third-party; police) when it came to providing a readable privacy policy. 
However, as the results were marginally non-significant, we inspected the results. They revealed 
that apps hosted by police had slightly less readable privacy policies (M = 38.71, SD = 6.92) than 
those hosted by third-parties (M = 39.62, SD = 10.44). In short, while it is possible to make 
privacy policies readable by the average user, the overwhelming majority of hosts fail to do so, 
compromising the privacy of users who may not understand to what they are agreeing before 
using an app.  
Inclusivity 
When trying to install the 240 apps for scoring, 69 could not be installed (referred to as 
‘fully exclusive’ apps). The reasons for this included broken URLs, ineligibility (e.g. accessible 
to first responders only), geographical location (detected from IP addresses), or fees or special 
software to install it. However, 171 apps were installed successfully. Of these, 104 required the 
user to create an account or to register to install them (‘partially exclusive’). These were not 
included in the analyses below, as we only analysed apps that we could access without these 
steps. This resulted in 67 inclusive apps, of which 24 required personal data to access certain 
functions (‘partially inclusive). By the time of analysis, three of these were no longer available 
(broken URLs), so there were remained only 21 partially inclusive apps. The remaining 43 were 
‘fully inclusive’. This resulted in a final sample of 64 apps. 
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To determine the relationship between host and inclusivity, a chi-square was conducted, 
and a significant relationship was found, χ2 = 28.37, p < .001: the proportion of police apps that 
were fully inclusive (40.96%) was significantly higher than the proportion of third-party apps 
(10.23%) that were fully inclusive. This showed that while considerably more police apps were 
fully inclusive than third-party apps, overall, a greater proportion of apps were only partially 
inclusive, making them inaccessible to some users. 
Anonymity 
Anonymity is an important consideration when designing apps, which commonly collect 
data including IP addresses, geographical locations, or device information. Given the potentially 
sensitive nature of matters reported (e.g. crimes), or potential risk to users of reporting (e.g. 
retaliation), we were interested in data shared via communication mechanisms. Therefore, 
explored whether apps that included an integrated reporting mechanism also claimed to provide 
anonymous ways of reporting (user anonymity is discussed more widely in the discussion). We 
could only access the reporting mechanisms of 64 inclusive apps. Of these 86% included an 
integrated reporting mechanism, of which 55% explicitly stated that they allowed for anonymous 
reporting prior to making a report.  
When testing the relationship between host and anonymity, a fisher’s exact test was not 
statistically significant, χ2 = 0.02, p = .86: police apps were no more likely to include anonymous 
reporting options (54.17%) than third-party ones (56.25%). Thus, while most apps provided 
some kind of reporting mechanism, only about half made it clear to users before reporting what 
kind of control they had over their anonymity. This is of particular concern in apps that also 
failed to provide readable privacy policies, leaving users in the dark as to the risks they are 
taking with their data when reporting crimes. 
App Features 
Next, we analysed relationships between host and app features (n = 64). The null 
hypotheses were that apps hosted by police or third-parties were no more or less likely to i) 
reassure, ii) safeguard, iii) empower, iv) engage, v) share information, or vi) surveil or track. 
COMMUNITY POLICING APPS 
 14 
Reassuring 
There was a range of 0-4 points (M = 0.91; SD = 0.86). The three highest scoring apps 
were Horry County Police Department, RCIPS, and Largo Police (3 points each). These included 
a friendly welcome page with a link to their mission statement (Horry County); detailed 
information for providing feedback (RCIPS); and detailed information about their approach to 
bias (Largo Police). As shown in table 1, no significant relationship was found between host and 
reassuring, F(1,63) = 1.40, p = .24: police apps were no more or less likely to reassure than 
third-party apps. Thus, although building trust is important to policing, police apps were not 
doing all they could to reassure users. On average, they only included about one of the four 
possible reassurance items. 
Safeguarding 
There was a range of 0-9 points (M = 2.15; SD = 1.62). The two highest scoring apps 
were Frederick County Sheriff, and Eloy Police Department (6 points each). They included items 
such as vacation watch (checking on vacant homes), ‘wanted’ suspects, emergency response 
(911), and safety tips (e.g. burglary prevention). A significant relationship was found between 
host and safeguarding, F(1,63) = 4.36, p = .04, η2 = .07: apps hosted by police were more likely 
to provide safeguarding items than those hosted by third-parties. However, on average, they only 
included 2.39 items out of a possible nine. 
Empowering 
There was a range of 0-3 points (M = 0.45; SD = 0.62). The four highest scoring apps 
were GATOR SAFE, Rutland Neighbourhood Watch, Hinckley Neighbourhood Watch, and 
LAPD Devonshire (2 points each). They included items such as ‘Friend Walk’, involving 
sending location data to a friend who can trigger an emergency call (GATOR SAFE); a 
comments ‘wall’, for alerting other users to real-time incidents (Rutland and Hinckley 
Neighbourhood Watch); and neighbourhood watch schemes (LAPD Devonshire). A significant 
relationship was found between host and empowering, F(1,62) = 5.30, p = .03, η2 = .08: third-
party apps were more empowering than police apps, although on average, they only included 
0.75 items out of a possible three.  
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Engaging 
There was a range of 0-8 points (M = 2.16; SD = 1.53). The five highest scoring apps 
were Yakima Police Department, DUBAI POLICE, Sebastian Police Department, El Cerrito 
Police Department, and Fellsmere Police Department (5 points each). They included items such 
as volunteering (Yakima Police Department), police museum tours (DUBAI POLICE), a gallery 
(Sebastian Police Department), a ride-along (El Cerrito Police Department), and events 
(Fellsmere Police Department), as well as social media links. A significant relationship was 
found between host and engaging, F(1,62) = 4.15, p < .05, η2 = .06: police apps were more 
engaging than third-party apps. However, on average, they only included 2.38 items out of a 
possible eight.  
Information Sharing 
There was a range of 0-6 points (M = 1.94; SD = 1.46). The three highest scoring apps 
were El Cerrito Police Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff and Medicine Hat Police 
Service (5 points each). They included items such as FAQs (El Cerrito Police Department), 
statistics (Los Angeles County Sheriff), application forms (Medicine Hat Police Service). A 
significant relationship was found between host and information sharing, F(1,62) = 6.11, p = .02,  
η2 = .09: police apps shared significantly more information (or provided document services) than 
third-party apps, although they only shared an average of 2.19 items out of a possible six.  
Table 1.  Host and App Features 
Host Third-party Police 
Reassuring M = 0.69; SD = 0.6 M = 0.98; SD = 0.93 
Safeguarding M = 1.44; SD = 1.32* M = 2.39; SD = 1.66* 
Empowerment M = 0.75; SD = 0.68* M = 0.35; SD = 0.57* 
Engagement M = 1.50; SD = 0.82* M = 2.38; SD = 1.51* 
Information sharing M = 1.19; SD = 1.38* M = 2.19; SD = 1.41* 
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Surveillance or Tracking 
A fisher’s exact test revealed that there was no relationship between host and surveillance 
or tracking systems, χ2 = 0.25, p = .62: it made no statistical difference who hosted the apps 
when it came to including surveillance mechanisms or not. Thus, police apps were no more or 
less likely to include surveillance mechanisms (5 apps, 10.42%) than third-party apps (1 app, 
6.25%) that could incite vigilantism. 
Navigation or Presentation 
We also tested for relationships between host and navigation or presentation, and found 
that apps hosted by police or third-parties were no more or less likely to be well presented or 
easy to navigate. Overall, apps scored just above average for navigation (range = 0-2, M = 1.09, 
SD = 0.83), and slightly better for presentation (range = 0-2, M = 1.31, SD = 0.75), indicating 
that there is still room for improvement in app design and maintenance. 
Anonymity, and Inclusivity, Reassurance, or Navigation 
When testing the measures above, we noticed that the presence or absence of anonymous 
reporting options was related to three measures: reassurance, F(1,62) = 6.22, p = .02, η2 = .09, 
apps that included anonymous reporting options had a tendency to include more reassuring items 
than those that did not; inclusivity, χ2 = 12.64, p < .001, apps with anonymous reporting 
mechanisms were more likely to be fully-inclusive than apps with no anonymous reporting 
options; and navigation, χ2 = 7.78 p = .02, apps with anonymous reporting mechanisms were 
more likely to be easy to navigate than apps with no anonymous reporting options. 
Table 2. Anonymity, and Reassurance; Inclusivity; Navigation  (n = 35)  
 Mean SD 
Reassurance (range 0-4 points)   
Anonymous 1.14* 0.81 
Not anonymous 0.62* 0.86 
Inclusivity (range 2-3 points)   
Anonymous 2.77** 0.43 
Not anonymous 2.55** 0.51 
Navigation (range 0-2 points)   
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Anonymous 1.34* 0.77 
Not anonymous 0.79* 0.80 
Hosts that included anonymous reporting options also tended to reassure users, to ensure 
that users could access the app, and to maintain it, more than those that did not, indicating that 
were taking user experience seriously. 
User Ratings 
Having evaluated the extent to which the apps sought to meet users’ needs, while 
adhering to the vision of the hosts. We attempted to evaluate whether these measures were 
actually related to user experience. To do this, we tested whether the measures predicted user 
ratings. The null hypothesis was that the presence or absence of these measures was unrelated to 
user ratings. 
Multiple linear regression was conducted using backward data entry. The variables of 
interest were inclusivity; informed consent; anonymity; reassuring; safeguarding; empowering; 
engaging; information sharing; navigation; presentation; and host. Seven of the models 
predicted user ratings. The best model included empowering; information sharing; navigation 
and presentation, F(4,50) = 4.80, p < .001 and explained 29.5% of variance in user ratings. Apps 
that were easy to navigate, that looked presentable, were empowering, and that shared 
information, were rated higher than apps that were not easy to navigate or presentable, and that 
did not empower or share information.  
Discussion 
The current study aimed to evaluate and describe existing police/citizen communication 
apps across measures related to the mission of the Policing Vision 2025 (NPCC, 2015) of 
making communities safer; and the US police principles of community policing (U.S. 
Department of Justice, n.d.), particularly in relation to the role of police also as citizens and 
citizens as police (The Home office, n.d.; The Law Enforcement Partnership, n.d). This was done 
by scoring apps (hosted by police or third parties), on the extent to which they included data 
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protection and app features measures. It also briefly investigated whether these measures 
affected users ratings. 
Just under 27% of apps were accessible without registering or providing login details. 
Some hosts may collect data on users to monetise it, by designing the app to have user accounts, 
and this was more common in third-party apps. Also, despite the fact that 86% included some 
kind of integrated reporting mechanism, only about half claimed to allow for anonymous 
reporting prior to a user making a report. More promising was the finding that inclusivity was 
related to anonymity, as fully inclusive apps were more likely claim to have anonymous 
reporting options than partially inclusive apps (although we could not determine whether an app 
that claimed to provide anonymous reporting options actually did so in practice). Thus, a greater 
number of hosts of fully-inclusive apps also appeared to be aware that data collection of this sort 
could compromise anonymity when reporting. Hosts that claimed to have provided anonymous 
reporting options were also more likely to seek to reassure users, and to make their apps easier to 
navigate. Therefore, these hosts appeared to align attempts to reassure users that they were 
trustworthy with actions. 
However, several apps offered ‘anonymous’ reporting while also collecting data that 
could potentially identify users. It seemed that users may not be aware that their anonymity could 
be compromised by providing e.g. location data5. Given the sensitive nature of reporting crimes 
or tips, anonymity was of concern when using several apps. Most notably, although police apps 
were generally more inclusive than those hosted by third-parties, 26 US police apps allowed for 
anonymous reporting, while 14 did not. Also, some tracked IP addresses covertly, some overtly, 
and others not at all, demonstrating the lack of consistency between police apps within just one 
country (discussed further below). Thus, while investigating anonymous reporting options in 
apps was revealing, anonymity cannot be reduced to this one domain, as other forms of data 
 
5 Several apps tracked IP addresses, email addresses, or locations of the authors, sometimes without them 
knowing until they tried to access a function and were blocked, although no informed consent had been provided for 
the app to access these data. As data tracking issues emerged randomly and unexpectedly during analysis, the 
number of apps with these issues was not calculated. These experiences were supported by a user review. They 
wrote, “ It keep [kept] automatically redirecting me to check an old email I don't even use. First of all. How the hell 
did they even get that email address without my permission.”  
COMMUNITY POLICING APPS 
 19 
collection can compromise it. The main point is that users should know before using an app what 
will happen to their data and how much control they will have over it (see Perera, McCormick, 
Bandara, Price, & Nuseibeh, 2016, for privacy protection guidelines).  
In the UK it is currently rare for a victim to report a crime against them anonymously and 
have it recorded as such (see National Crime Recording Standards, section 3.6., n.d.). However, 
anonymous digital reporting is useful for encouraging descriptive reporting of workplace 
harassment (e.g. Talk To Spot; Vault) and mental health (e.g. Woebot), where people are often 
reluctant to speak to a human interviewer. Therefore, while anonymous victim crime reporting is 
currently rarely supported in the UK, it might be worth exploring as both a way of getting people 
to report crimes in the first place, and to provide details that they might not wish to disclose to a 
police officer (e.g. in cases of sexual assault). This should be balanced with the need to address 
risk and safeguard victims. Thus, anonymous reporting mechanisms should include two-way 
dyadic follow ups, where risks can be assessed and victims can be encouraged to provide details 
that they might have wished to withhold in the initial report. The main point is that users should 
have some kind of control over their anonymity in the initial stages of reporting, which can be 
modified later. Dyadic follow-ups could also be effective in filtering out the minority of false 
reports (estimated to be about 4% of cases by Kelly, Lovett, & Regan, 2005. See also Saunders, 
2012, for a review of rape allegations).  
Privacy policies are one way of acquiring informed consent. Therefore, for the present 
research, informed consent was measured by inspecting privacy policies – to see if they were 
accessible and easy to understand. For this, the privacy policy found on the landing page of each 
app was assessed for readability. About a third of apps either provided no privacy policy or there 
was no access to it (e.g. a broken URL), and Flesch reading ease labels revealed that only 10% 
were understandable to users without at least a university level education. Therefore, even when 
apps warned users about the ways that personal data was collected and used, these warnings were 
generally confusing. More concerning was that privacy policies provided by police were no 
easier to read than ones provided by third-parties. If anything, there was a slight trend in the 
other direction.  
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The apps analysed in the present research provided similar privacy agreement 
information and options as other apps more generally (e.g. yes/no buttons for access to location 
data). However, given civilian mistrust in police (Ray et al., 2017), it is worth policing apps 
making the effort to be transparent, to be seen to be transparent (see Brucato, 2015; Jackson, 
2015), and to give users clear information about their anonymity and privacy both before 
installing the app, and before using functions that need specific permissions. One approach might 
be to consider privacy ‘labels’. Kelley, Bresee, Cranor, and Reeder (2009) found that informed 
consent was obtained more quickly and accurately, and the process was more enjoyable, when 
using privacy labels rather than policies. Therefore, privacy labels might help to protect users 
better than privacy policies when using police/citizen communication apps, as they should make 
it easier for users to understand how their data will be used.  
Seeking trust was evaluated further by the measure ‘reassuring users’. Given the 
association between police fairness and/or perceived legitimacy, and citizens’ willingness to 
cooperate with police (Jackson et al., 2012), it was anticipated that apps hosted by police would 
be vigilant reassuring users, in an attempt to foster trust in a digital domain. However, apps 
hosted by police were no more likely to include reassuring items than apps hosted by third-
parties. As discussed above, the only significant relationship found was related to anonymity, as 
apps that sought to reassure users with words (e.g. mission statements), also acted in a 
trustworthy way by seeking to protect them (anonymous reporting). 
The second measure was top down safeguarding (e.g. safety tips). Police apps included 
more safeguarding items than third-party ones. Thus, apps hosted by police generally aligned 
with the mission of the UK Policing Vision 2025 (NPCC, 2015) of making communities safer, 
even though most of them were hosted by US police. In the US, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (n.d.) states that empowering citizens is important if they are to hold authorities to 
account, but a challenge facing policing is how to balance safeguarding and empowerment. 
Nevertheless, some apps successfully included both safeguarding items and ways to empower 
citizens (e.g. neighbourhood watch), although some items were concerning. While several US 
police apps included useful information related to sex offenders (e.g. Megan’s Law, 1996), some 
included live sex offender crime maps. This may have been an attempt at empowering citizens, 
but could also be seen to incite vigilantism. Indeed, Cubellis, et al. (2018) created a Sex 
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Offender-Vigilante database that included 279 incidents of vigilantism against sex offenders 
(including murder), which shows that vigilantism is a problem when citizens can locate and track 
individuals. Thirty-seven US police apps did not include sex offender maps and five did, 
demonstrating the lack of consistency in approaches to digital policing in the US, which might be 
related in part to the devolved governance of policing (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.). 
Digital technologies can also motivate citizens to get involved in police-related activities 
or content e.g. ‘web sleuthing’ (Yardley et al., 2018). Many of the apps attempted to benefit from 
this by seeking to engage citizens, and police apps included the greatest number of engaging 
items (e.g. community events). The items they included appeared to be ways of fostering face-to-
face contact between police and the community – which is important for reducing prejudice and 
increasing trust (Pettigrew, 1998). Thus, when it came to engagement, police appeared to design 
apps to foster physical community contact. This suggested that they were trying to present 
themselves part of the community. In line with Bradford’s work (2014), there may have been 
motivated to create a shared identity between police and users (citizens) – to encourage 
cooperation, disclosure, or social solidarity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2000). However, as the items 
largely focused on presenting ways that police work for the community (e.g. ‘ride-along’), it is 
unlikely that the items would have achieved a shared identity of police as citizens and citizens as 
police (The Home Office, n.d.; The Law Enforcement Partnership, n.d.). This was also hinted at 
by the fact that police and third-party apps prioritised empowerment and engagement differently. 
Police apps were less focused than third parties on empowering the public (potentially out of a 
concern about control) and more focused on police-led engagement. In short, police apps 
appeared to be designed more in line with the UK Policing Vision 2025 (NPCC, 2015) of 
protecting and safeguarding citizens, than the Peelian principle of seeing police as citizens and 
citizens as police (The Home Office, n.d.; The Law Enforcement Partnership, n.d) and 
encouraging the police and citizens to see this also. 
Police have traditionally shared one-way information with citizens (Heverin & Zach, 
2010), but technology offers the possibility of two-way interactions. We were under the 
impression when starting this research that two-way interactions were common in citizen-police 
apps, as many landing pages advertised integrated feedback and reporting mechanisms, but this 
was not the case in reality. Police apps contained significantly more information sharing items 
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than third-party apps, but information was almost exclusively top-down, and primarily about 
disseminating crime, incident, traffic information, or news (see Heverin and Zach), although 
statistics, reports and FAQs were also found. Other than many apps offering a one-way reporting 
mechanism and a few including a one-way user feedback function, no police app allowed 
citizens to contribute to information sharing, or question or co-create content. Also, no police 
app allowed users to see feedback of others, despite this being recommended by Six (2003) as a 
way of fostering trust. This may well be by design (to control the content), but it might be worth 
allowing for bottom-up information sharing (e.g. incident updates), or dashboards containing 
citizen feedback and actions taken, to encourage two-way communication or to allow “digital 
citizens” to participate in and challenge the practices of police (Mossberger et al., 2007).  This 
has become particularly relevant in light of the killing of George Floyd, both in the US (BBC, 
2020) and in the UK (Koram, 2020). It seems that apps are not capitalising on the potential of 
digital technology to allow for truly dyadic communication. This means that citizens have no 
way of accessing, for instance, responses to feedback of others, and have no way of directly 
contributing to content in meaningful or empowering ways. 
The analyses described above investigated the extent to which app hosts had sought to 
include appropriate measures. So, as a final step, we tested whether the measures were related to 
user experience. We found that empowering; information sharing; navigation; and presentation 
were most significantly associated with user ratings, indicating that users are most influenced by 
the app’s appearance or usability, and the degree to which the app informed or empowered them, 
when providing their rating score. This suggests that it is worth making well-constructed and 
well-maintained apps that include both top-down information and means to empower users, as 
this may provide a more holistic experience for digital citizens. However, user ratings are a 
limited way of making these determinations, which would be tested more effectively 
experimentally or by analysing user comments. These approaches warrant further investigation 
in future research.  
There were also other limitations to the study. First, while the work is relevant to the 
design of future police apps internationally, this paper is pitched at US and UK policing, as the 
authors of the present research are based in the UK, and were limited to apps that were available 
in the UK version of Google play (see Appendix B for app locations). A police practitioner also 
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informed us (anecdotally) that he had never known of a report originating from a UK based 
third-party app, and that apps are seldom used to report crimes in the UK, although several 
online tools have recently been launched for people to report Covid-19 lockdown breaches 
(Burgess, 2020). Second, our decision not to use the reporting mechanisms was taken to avoid 
submitting fake reports, but this limited our understanding of the ways that they actually worked. 
For instance, we were only able to measure anonymity according to explicit statements about 
reporting anonymity prior to reporting, rather than whether reports were genuinely anonymous. 
We were also not able to determine whether reports could be made (and saved) without 
submitting them straightaway, or what feedback/updates following a report looked like. Thus, 
this study looked at the extent to which apps sought to provide the various measures, rather than 
whether this was achieved in reality. 
To summarise, our analyses focused on comparing apps hosted by police with those 
hosted by third parties, and it became apparent that police apps appeared to take on a top-down 
rather than collaborative role. They tended to focus on police-led engagement, top-down 
safeguarding and information-sharing, rather than on reassuring or empowering, while third-
party apps generally focused on empowering. For instance, in police apps, there was seldom a 
means for users to co-create content, and information was filtered. We were also surprised to see 
a lack of steps taken to foster trust, and had concerns about how they gathered informed consent. 
First, because several apps tracked IP addresses, sometimes covertly, and second, because even 
when apps included a privacy policy before installation, they were largely very difficult to 
understand. As there is mistrust in police, police should be finding ways to tackle it digitally, or 
they risk amplifying it. Creating digital accountability mechanisms with measures to safeguard 
privacy and anonymity might go some way towards achieving this.  
However, there was also some inconsistencies. For instance, the two US police apps were 
the highest scoring, while two were the lowest scoring. Some differences were justified (e.g., 
level of information provided), whereas others were problematic (e.g., provision of anonymous 
reporting). This suggests either that there could be a disconnect between the concept of having a 
policing app, its architecture, and the police officers who manage and use it (e.g. Sanders & 
Henderson, 2013); or that the digital policing message is inconsistent (U.S. Department of 
Justice, n.d). Another explanation might be related to the devolved governance of policing down 
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to local level in the US (U.S. Department of Justice), compared with the UK, where solutions 
like the “Single Online Home” have been developed centrally. It is also worth bearing in mind 
that external app developers will have their own interests, so app design will not always be 
driven solely by policing concerns. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to agree upon a 
coherent message before making digital mechanisms, as these can amplify inconsistencies or 
underlying issues (e.g. bias) and potentially undermine policing efforts. Taking all this into 
account, carefully crafted digital communication systems between citizens and police have the 
potential to contribute to community policing in a digital world. 
Based on the systematic evaluation of these apps and our discussion points, we therefore 
propose twelve design considerations for those developing digital mechanisms (as stand-alone 
apps or integrated into websites) for community-police collaboration. Two and three are 
exclusively for mechanisms that include reporting, while the others are considerations for all 
digital community-police mechanisms. 
1. Digital mechanisms should provide privacy policies that are readable (this can be checked by 
using the Flesch online calculator (n.d.)) and concise. These should be clearly provided on the 
landing page, and within the mechanism itself (particularly before reporting), so that users can 
trust that their data will only used in ways to which they have provided informed consent.  
 
2. Digital reporting mechanisms might consider giving anonymous reporting options that give 
the user control over what kind of personal data they consent to sharing when making an 
initial report (e.g. IP addresses), and control over who can see the report (e.g. specially-trained 
officers when dealing with sexual abuse reports). They should also consider two-way follow 
ups, so that risks to the user can be assessed, modifications to anonymity can be discussed, 
and so that false reports can be filtered out. 
 
3. Digital reporting mechanisms should make it explicit prior to making a report exactly how to 
report and what will happen to a report, so that users know to what they are consenting when 
reporting. This can be achieved using contextual help features, demos or screenshots. 
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4. Digital mechanisms might consider including items that help users understand the aims and 
objectives of police, and their rights. These could help to increase transparency and foster 
trust. 
 
5. Digital mechanisms might consider including safeguarding items, so that users can protect 
themselves and others. 
 
6. Digital mechanisms might consider including items designed to empower users in positive 
ways, so that they can participate in and challenge authorities and institutions, they can keep 
themselves and communities safe, and they can become an active part of building 
transparency and trust.  
 
7. Digital mechanisms should not include items that have the potential to incite vigilantism, such 
as sex offender mapping. 
 
8. Digital mechanisms might consider including items designed to engage users, so that they can 
participate in, create, and contribute to content. This should help to create an identity with 
shared values, where police see themselves and are seen also as citizens, and citizens can 
contribute to policing. This could encourage intervention for the common good. 
 
9. Digital mechanisms should share accurate and timely information with users, but take care not 
to filter it in a way that either patronises users or masks elements that are key to transparency 
and building trust. It might also be worth considering including elements that encourage two-
way information sharing and feedback. 
 
10. Digital mechanisms should be easy to navigate, with buttons that provide direct and clear 
links to functions, rather than navigation loops, broken URLs, or unnecessary links to web 
pages. We also recommend that they look simple, clear and uncluttered. 
 
11. Police forces might consider working together to decide upon a coherent and consistent 
message when creating digital mechanisms, and include elements amplify this message rather 
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than contradict it. However, the architecture of the digital mechanism should be flexible 
enough to be adapted to the concerns of the demographic that each mechanism serves. 
 
12. Digital mechanisms should be maintained and monitored by trained teams. For those with 
reporting mechanisms, teams should include staff with training in handling victim and witness 
reports ethically. 
In conclusion, we set out to investigate two-way digital communication between police 
and citizens. However, despite only selecting apps whose landing pages gave the impression of 
two-way communication, in reality, only a small minority allowed for truly dyadic 
communication. Thus, it appears that two-way police and citizens do not yet communicate in this 
way when it comes to digital mechanisms. When it came to comparing third party and police 
apps, third party apps tended to focus on empowering citizens, while police apps tended to 
position police as separate from citizens, focusing on safeguarding, sharing top-down 
information, and police-led engagement. However, surprisingly, police apps took no more steps 
to reassure users than third party apps, and their privacy policies were equally difficult to read, so 
they probably largely failed to attain informed consent from users. This is of particular concern 
when user data is being collected without users’ knowledge, for instance if they think they are 
making an anonymous report, but their location is known to the app host. As trust in policing is 
key to citizen cooperation, and we are increasingly living digital lives, if police forces are 
considering providing or updating a digital mechanism to communicate with citizens, it would be 
worth ensuring that the mechanism is, and is seen to be, trustworthy.  
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Appendix A 
Inclusion and Exclusion Steps 
Step 1: (These inclusion/exclusion decisions were taken from data generated by 
Google Play)  
Communication systems selected by the computing team (1208) were reviewed 
independently by authors from the psychology department, and selected for further review 
according to certain Google Play “app_categories”. Therefore, inclusion/exclusion decisions 
were based solely on the information the app developer had supplied to Google Play. At this 
stage, the authors did not open the Google Play store listing webpage for each app. 
An app was excluded from further review if it fell into one of the following Google Play 
app_categories: Action, Adventure, Arcade, Art and Design, Board, Card, Casino, Comics, 
Finance, Food and Drink, Health and Fitness, Medical, Music and Audio, Parenting, 
Photography, Puzzle, Racing, Role Playing, Shopping, Simulation, Trivia, Weather, Word. This 
was largely because these categories were either games, or because they addressed issues that 
were irrelevant to our research, such as ‘weather’. We were aware that some viable apps may 
have been excluded by this decision, but considered that most developers who had built a system 
for citizen/police communication would select an appropriate category. 
Step 2: (These inclusion/exclusion decisions were also taken from data generated by 
Google Play)  
Some categories such as ‘Communication’ (a keyword used in our search) appeared to 
fulfil our inclusion criteria following Step 1, while others were vague and needed further 
scrutiny. These included: Auto and Vehicles, Books and Reference, Business, Casual, 
Communication, Education, Educational, Entertainment, Events, House and Home, Libraries and 
Demo, Lifestyle, Maps and Navigation, News and Magazines, Personalization, Productivity, 
Social, Strategy, Tools, Travel and Local, Video Players and Editors. For this step, we inspected 
the content of the “app_descriptions’, “app_ratings”, and “app_prices”, and 617 apps were 
excluded for the following reasons, resulting in 591 apps. 
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App Prices: 33 apps that were explicitly described as ‘paid’ were excluded, as one of the 
aims of the research is to describe and evaluate apps on the basis of inclusivity/ 
exclusivity. 
 
Foreign Language: The first language of the authors is English, and the research was 
conducted in the UK, so 4 apps in a language other than English were excluded. 
 
Scanners: Scanners allowed app users to listen to radio wave dialogue but did not 
include user interaction, so 50 scanner apps were removed. 
 
Driving: 47 apps were dedicated to driving, such as speed cameras, traffic warnings, or 
roadside assistance apps. Where there was no interactive communication, and where they 
were not related to police or community concerns, they were also excluded. 
 
Reference or books: 43 apps were simple information sources or literature, such as 
reference manuals, book chapters or novels. These were excluded for being non-
interactive and/or for being irrelevant. 
 
Education: 47 apps were related either to police officer study aids or schools, and were 
unrelated to citizen-police communication, so they were also excluded. 
 
Entertainment: 31 apps were games (e.g. police chases) or entertainment (e.g. police 
costumes). These were excluded for being irrelevant. 
 
Background checks: 30 apps were excluded as they were exclusively designed to allow 
users to check the background of individuals, and there was no interactive citizen-police 
communication. 
 
Home security: 24 apps were removed because they were either smart home systems 
(e.g. doorbell alerts), or surveillance cameras. While some smart systems can be used 
retrospectively as evidence, they did not include interactive citizen-police 
communication. 
 
Personal: 19 apps were removed as they focused on alternative social interactions, e.g.  
dating or religion, and were irrelevant to the research. 
 
Business: 53 apps were removed as they focused on unrelated business tools (e.g. data 
storage etc.), and did not include interactive citizen-police communication. 
 
Tools: 50 apps were removed for being unrelated to the research (e.g. torches, 
calculators, ringtones etc.), and/or because there was no interactive citizen-police 
communication. 
 
News and Magazines: 32 apps were removed for disseminating one-way information 
with no interactive component and/or being unrelated to policing or crime. 
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No ratings: 154 apps were removed as they had received no user ratings. This decision 
was taken as user ratings are analysed. 
Step 3. (Inclusion/exclusion decisions taken from information available on the app’s 
webpage) 
Next, we assessed whether the remaining 591 apps were relevant for the current study. 
Relevant apps were those that encouraged some kind of integrated police/citizen interactive 
communication. This step involved two authors opening the Google Play store listing webpage 
for each app and examining both the app’s description and accompanying images to establish its 
relevance. This was the landing page a user would find when searching for the app, and they 
would see the information provided before deciding whether or not to install it. Typical reasons 
for excluding an app included: irrelevance to research objectives (e.g. not related to policing or 
citizen safety), broken URL, foreign language (that was not evident from “app_descriptions’, 
“app_ratings” or “app_categories”) or because it was a paid app (which had not been evident 
from the “app_prices”). To ensure there was systematic agreement regarding which apps should 
be excluded, we first selected 60 apps (10.15% of the remaining sample) for independent double 
coding (see Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2014). Agreement between the two independent raters was 
98.3%, with a Gwet’s AC1 interrater reliability test value of .97, indicating near perfect 
agreement (Gwet, 2014; Wongpakaran et al., 2013). Thirty of the apps were excluded at this 
stage. After completing the interrater reliability assessment, the same two authors divided the 
remaining 531 apps and independently determined whether the remaining apps were relevant for 
the study. Of the remaining 531 apps, 274 were excluded, resulting in 317 apps.  
Step 4. (Duplicates) 
Of these 317 apps, 77 duplicates were found and put to one side. These included apps that 
had either been upgraded (the older version was removed), or they were almost identical to 
another app by the same developer (a different name and/or image, but identical content). This 
was generally where different US police departments or sheriffs had used the same app 
developer. This final exclusion resulted in 240 apps. Apps were installed on Android One Mi A2 
Lite mobile phones. Research phones were registered to research google accounts, to protect the 
privacy of the authors when using the apps.  
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Appendix B 
App locations 
Continent Countries Number of apps 
Africa (17) Ethiopia 1 
 
Ghana 1 
 
Guyana 1 
 
Namibia 1 
 
Nigeria 2 
 
South Africa 10 
 
Uganda 1 
America (92) Brasil 1 
 
Canada 11 
 
Costa Rica 1 
 
Mexico 1 
 
US 78 
Asia (31) Abu Dhabi 1 
 
Bangladesh 2 
 
Dubai 1 
 
Hong Kong 1 
 
India 17 
 
Malaysia 2 
 
Nepal 1 
 
Oman 1 
 
Pakistan 1 
 
Philippines 1 
 
Singapore 1 
 
Sri Lanka 1 
 
UAE 1 
Australasia (2) New Zealand 2 
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Europe (20) Denmark 1 
 
France 1 
 
German 2 
 
Not known 1 
 
Netherlands 1 
 
Romania 1 
 
Serbia 1 
 
Sweden 2 
 
UK/UKOT 10 
Global/Not known (8) Global 6 
 
Not known 2 
TOTAL 34 known countries 171 
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Appendix C 
Measure Interrater 
Test 
AC1/AC2 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
95% CIs P value 
Reassuring Users AC2 - 
Ratio 
0.81 0.07 [0.67,0.95] < .001 
      
Top Down 
Safeguarding 
AC2 - 
Ratio 
0.79 0.09 [0.61,0.98] < .001 
      
Immediate 
Emergency 
Response 
AC1 - 
Nominal 
0.91 0.09 [0.73,1] < .001 
      
Empowering 
Communities 
AC2 - 
Ratio 
0.83 0.12 [0.59,1] < .001 
      
Engaging 
Communities 
AC2 - 
Ratio 
0.93 0.03 [0.86,0.99] < .001 
      
Information 
Sharing 
AC2 - 
Ratio 
0.86 0.06 [0.73,0.98] < .001 
      
Document Services AC1 - 
Nominal 
0.93 0.07 [0.78,1] < .001 
      
Surveillance and 
Tracking 
AC1 - 
Nominal 
1 0 [1,1] < .001 
      
Reporting 
Mechanism 
AC1 - 
Nominal 
0.95 0.05 [0.85,1] < .001 
      
Anonymous 
Reporting Options 
AC1 - 
Nominal 
0.92 0.08 [0.76.1] < .001 
      
Navigation AC2 - 
Ordinal 
0.79 0.08 [0.63,0.95] < .001 
      
Presentation AC2 - 
Ordinal 
0.85 0.06 [0.72,0.98] < .001 
      
Note. We initially failed to reach sufficient interrater reliability for the variable “Immediate 
Emergency Response” AC1 = 0.27, SE = 0.21, 95% CI [-0.17,0.71], p = .22. This failure was due 
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to a misunderstanding between raters regarding the wording of the definition. After failing 
interrater reliability for this measure, the two raters clarified the definition (*adding the term 
‘integrated’ to the definition) and retrained. Following this, we randomly selected a new set of 
apps to reassess this single, modified measure. The two raters independently rated the apps solely 
on this modified measure. The result of the interrater reliability test for the second parsing of this 
measure is high and is reported above. All other measures reached sufficient interrater reliability 
on the first iteration. Further note, prior to analysis “Immediate Emergency Responses” (range 0-
1) and “Top Down Safeguarding” (range 0-8) were combined into a single measure “Top Down 
Safeguarding” (combined range 0-9). Similarly, “Information Sharing” (range 0-5) and 
“Document Services” (range 0-1) were collapsed into a single measure “Information Sharing and 
Document Services” (combined range 0-6). Measures “App_ratings”, “Author”, “Readability 
(Flesch reading ease)”, “Inclusivity” and “Privacy (Flesh reading ease)” were all objective 
measures and did not therefore require assessments of the degree of agreement among raters. 
Measure Definitions:  
Reassuring Users: If apps included either procedural policies, freedom of information, or a 
mission statement they scored 1 point, if they did not, they scored 0 points; if the app host 
followed up user input (e.g. communicated with a citizen who had submitted a crime tip) they 
scored 1 point, if not they scored 0 points; if they provided users with a means to provide 
feedback to the app hosts (e.g. complaint) they scored 1 point, if not they scored 0 points; if they 
informed users of their rights or demonstrated a commitment to reducing prejudice or bias they 
scored 1 point, if not they scored 0 points. There was a range of 0-4 points. 
Top Down Safeguarding: If apps provided top down alerts or warnings (e.g. live crimes or 
natural disasters), wanted posters, safety tips (e.g. burglar prevention), tools (e.g. compasses, 
torches, or maps), crime maps, house watch schemes (e.g. police ‘drives-by’), property logging, 
top down checking in schemes (e.g. on vulnerable adults) they scored a point, There was 1 score 
for each, with a range from 0-8 points. 
Immediate Emergency Response: If apps provided an [integrated*] means to get immediate 
response to an emergency (e.g., a 911 button) they scored 1 point, if not they scored 0 points. 
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Empowering Communities: If apps provided means for communities to respond to SOS (e.g. a 
distressed user sending an alert to other users); for communities to notify others about risk (e.g. a 
crime or natural disaster); or raised awareness, rights, resources (e.g. charity funding pages), they 
scored 1 point for each. The range was 0-3 points. 
Engaging Communities: If apps provided social media (e.g. Twitter), chat options (e.g. a wall 
or forum), recruitment, events, a gallery, membership or collaboration, training (e.g. cadets), 
community interaction (e.g. ‘rides-along’), they scored a point. The range was from 0-8 points. 
Information Sharing: If apps provided information: statistics; terms and definitions; reports; 
news; FAQs; they scored 1 point for each. The range was from 0-5 points. 
Document Services: If apps provided documentation services (e.g. applications or online forms) 
they scored 1 point, if not they scored 0. 
Surveillance and Tracking: Some apps provided sex offender maps, or methods for spying on 
neighbours. These were deemed ethically unsound, and with the potential to incite vigilantism. 
Therefore, if these features were present the app scored 0 points, if they were not present, the app 
scored 1 point. 
Reporting Mechanism: If apps provided an integrated reporting mechanism (e.g. for providing 
tips or reporting crimes) they scored 1 point, if not, they scored 0 points 
Anonymous Reporting Options: If apps made it clear explicitly that the user could choose 
whether to report anonymously or not prior to reporting, and there was an anonymous option, 
then it scored 1 point; if it was unclear or no anonymous reporting options were available then it 
scored 0 points. 
Navigation: Apps with a clear menu or index that linked to each page were assigned 2 points. 
Apps that needed several clicks (or were unclear/confusing) to access some pages scored 1. Apps 
scored 0 if they were difficult to navigate, e.g. lack of menu, confusing (or hidden) links, 
navigation loops, or if they needed a search option. The range was from 0-2 points. 
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Presentation: Clear, uncluttered apps (e.g. a balance between text and pictures) were assigned 2 
points. A score of 1 was given to apps with mediocre presentation (e.g. images which were not 
engaging or that made poor use of space). Confusing and cluttered apps scored 0, (e.g. too much 
information on a page, and no/too many pictures). The range was from 0-2 points.Author 
statement file 
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